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Abstract
Technology developed for the T2K electromagnetic calorimeter has been adapted to make a
small footprint, reliable, segmented detector to characterise anti-neutrinos emitted by nuclear
reactors. The device has been developed and demonstrated by the University of Liverpool and
underwent field tests at the Wylfa Magnox Reactor on Anglesey, UK. It was situated in a 20 ft ISO
shipping container, above ground, roughly 60 m from the 1.5 GWth reactor core. Based on the
design of the T2K Near Detector ECal, the device detects anti-neutrinos through the distinctive
delayed coincidence signal of inverse β-decay interactions using extruded plastic scintillator and
Hamamatsu Multi-Pixel Photon Counters.
1. Introduction
Due to the increasing global energy demand, the number of civilian nuclear power plants is
expected to increase in the foreseeable future. Given this development, new technology capable of
monitoring the activity of a nuclear reactor becomes increasingly useful. Anti-neutrino detection
technology has the potential for non-intrusive monitoring of reactor activity at short to medium
distances. In order to allow operation at civilian nuclear power plants, it is crucial for such a
device to conform to site safety requirements, be easy to operate and maintain, whilst being
compact (a tonne-scale device).
The project presented here aims to provide a reliable, autonomous device for the monitor-
ing of reactor anti-neutrino emissions in safeguards context. A version of such a device was
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deployed at Wylfa Power Station, Anglesey, UK through the aid of the Department of Energy
and Climate Control (DECC) and the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) in the UK. The
detector was constructed and commissioned at the University of Liverpool, loaded into a 20 ft
ISO refrigerated shipping container, and shipped to Wylfa via a HIAB truck. The container
was situated approximately 60 m from the centre of the reactor core, outside the inner security
barrier of Wylfa reactor building and required only a connection to a power supply for oper-
ation. The detector itself is roughly 1 tonne in mass and utilises technology from the ND280
electromagnetic calorimeter (ECal) of the T2K particle physics experiment [1]. This technology
is highly suitable for use on reactor sites thanks to the use of non-toxic materials with a high
flash point and an extremely robust mechanical design to ensure that no damage is sustained
in transport. The T2K ECal that formed the baseline design for the mechanical structure of
this device withstood the magnitude 9 April 2011 earthquake in Japan with minimal damage,
demonstrating the robustness of the design.
2. Reactor Anti-Neutrinos
Anti-neutrinos are weakly interacting, sub-atomic, particles produced in the β-decay of nuclei.
In operating nuclear reactors with thermal power of order 1 GWth, they are produced at a rate of
approximately 1020/s by the decays of fission daughter nuclei. Both the number of anti-neutrinos
produced and their average energy are dependent on the parent fission nuclei. At these anti-
neutrino energies the inverse β-decay (IBD) interaction [2], ν¯e + p → e+ + n, is the dominant
signal. In the late 1970s, the detection of these reactor anti-neutrinos was first recognised as a
means to monitor reactor activity non-intrusively [3]. The detection of the positron, followed
shortly by detection of a thermal neutron capture gives a distinctive delayed coincidence signal
that identifies anti-neutrino interactions. The energy of the detected positron is approximately
linearly correlated with the energy of the anti-neutrino, allowing anti-neutrino spectroscopy and
core isotope measurements with a detector of sufficient sensitivity.
Anti-neutrino detectors used in particle physics experiments for IBD are usually large (from
10 to multiple 1000 tonnes) liquid scintillator devices using Photo-Multiplier Tubes (PMT) for
readout[4, 5, 6]. Smaller detectors of the order 1 tonne and constructed of suitably “safe” ma-
terials, can be placed in close proximity to a reactor whilst being cheap enough for wide scale
deployment. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory developed a prototype, liquid scintilla-
tor based, anti-neutrino detector of order 1 tonne in size, the SONGS1 detector [7, 8]. The
detector was deployed at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) where reactor
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anti-neutrinos were used to observe both the operational state of the reactor (on/off) and the
fuel burn up during operations. The fuel burn-up manifests as the decrease in anti-neutrino
count rate as the fuel cycle progresses and uranium transmutes to plutonium. The observations
made by the SONGS1 experiment successfully demonstrated the concept of a small scale reactor
anti-neutrino monitoring device to be sound and feasible. This has prompted a number of efforts
worldwide [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14].
These efforts then motivated the IAEA report [15], noting the “technical limitations that
prevent immediate incorporation”. This report recommended an ideal detector for safeguards
should be: of inert construction; non-liquid medium; easy operation; cheap, portable; robust;
capable of above-ground operation; ideally with easy deployment in an ISO freight container.
By utilising the isotope dependence of both the anti-neutrino rate and energy [16], it is
possible to measure the isotope content of the reactor core as well as its power level over a
given time period. As such, anti-neutrino detectors could provide material accounting, non-
intrusively, during reactor operation. Due to the weakly interacting nature (i.e. low interaction
cross-sections) of anti-neutrino particles, they pass through the containment vessels and other
shielding, allowing direct and unshieldable observation of the core. Therefore, a reliable, safe,
device could be beneficially deployed as an automated safeguard and accountancy measure,
continuously providing detailed information about the reactor core state.
3. The Liverpool Prototype Detector
3.1. Technology
The device deployed at Wylfa uses neutrino detector technology from the ECal of the T2K
experiment designed to precisely measure the energy of electrons and positrons [1, 17]. In con-
trast to traditional anti-neutrino detectors the sensitive volume is formed of extruded plastic
scintillator bars read out by silicon photo-multipliers, Hamamatsu Multi Pixel Photon Counters
(MPPCs). The plastic scintillator is robust, non-toxic, has a high flash point and is cost effec-
tive. A wavelength shifting optical fibre is threaded through each bar to guide the light on to the
MPPC readout. The MPPCs operate on low voltage, are very compact and incredibly resilient,
allowing for a small, transportable detector footprint whilst being easy to operate compared to
traditional PMTs. The active detector region includes sheets of gadolinium to allow the detection
of thermal neutrons, exploiting its high thermal neutron capture cross-section and its ability to
act as a neutron-to-γ-ray converter [18]. The electronics readout system is based on the same
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) boards used in the T2K experiment with significant
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firmware adjustments for the detection of inverse β-decay interactions. An internal veto system
is included in the design for the rejection of cosmic ray events and effective operation at ground
level.
The anti-neutrino detector contains roughly 1 tonne of plastic scintillator as the anti-neutrino
interaction target and occupies a 1.7 m × 1.7 m footprint instrumented as 1720 individual chan-
nels. The plastic scintillator bars measure 40 mm × 40 mm × 1520 mm, arranged in a hodoscope
layout with alternating scintillator bar direction in the x-y plane by 90 degrees each layer. The
scintillator planes are interleaved with gadolinium sheets for neutron capture. The 1520 mm bar
length was chosen as it was the shortest used in the T2K ECal. Each scintillator bar uses Ku-
raray wavelength shifting fibres coupled to the MPPCs to detect the scintillator response. The
mechanical support structure ensures correct alignment even during and after transport, allowing
assembly off-site and transport of the fully assembled system as a drop-in system, minimising
disruption to site operations. The detector is surrounded by 75 mm of high density polyethylene
neutron shielding to reduce background from the fast neutrons produced by the reactor, with
25 mm of the shielding being boron-loaded to capture thermalised neutrons.
The readout stack is derived from the T2K readout system and consists of 31 Trip-T Front-
end Boards (TFB) [17] connected to a Readout Merger Module (RMM) [17] connected to an
IBM-compatible PC running the Maximum Integration Data Acquisition System (MIDAS) [19].
Each TFB reads out up to 64 MPPCs and converts the analogue charge signal from the MPPCs
using analogue-to-digital converters. In addition, the electronics are adapted to operate on an
internal trigger, rather than the external neutrino beam-synchronised pulsed trigger used in T2K.
This trigger system fires upon passing a non-localised charge threshold, a signature expected from
neutron captures on the gadolinium (see section 3.2). Using a FIFO buffer, the detector stores
30µs of data preceding the trigger. The RMM sends the read-out and merged information
through a gigabit Ethernet link to the data acquisition PC, recording the data to disk.
For ease of transport and deployment, the detector was loaded into a 20 ft ISO refrigerated
shipping container. The shipping container was converted into a mobile laboratory such that
all required resources for the operation of the detector were included within, including climate
control and power supply. The self-contained unit proved simple to deploy on the reactor site
with minimal overheads for the power station staff. The unit requires a 3-phase 420 V power
socket (primarily to power the container’s refrigeration unit), and preferably a data connection
for remote operations of the device. Pictures of the full detector are shown in figure 1.
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Figure 1: Pictures of the completed anti-neutrino detector. Left: at Liverpool. Right: Installed into the shipping
container.
3.2. Anti-neutrino interactions in the detector
The plastic scintillator forms the active target region for anti-neutrino inverse β-decay inter-
actions. These interactions produce a positron and an epi-thermal neutron in the detector. The
positron is detected immediately through the light emitted as it passes through the scintillator
until it annihilates, resulting in two back-to-back 511 keV γ-rays. The majority of the γ-rays
will Compton scatter inside the detector and leave energy deposits close to the current noise
threshold and are hence not used in the positron selection. The neutron will be detected later
when it captures on a nucleus following a random walk with multiple scatters through the bulk
of the detector. Gadolinium is used in the detector as a neutron capture agent due to its high
thermal neutron capture cross-section and the release of an 8 MeV γ-ray cascade on capture. In
the detector the neutron capture is then observed through the Compton Scattering of the emit-
ted γ-rays, creating a spatially diffuse energy deposit that is strongly correlated in time. The
distinct signature of the neutron is used to trigger on events of interest and save them for the
data analysis. Anti-neutrino interactions are then selected by looking for the distinctive delayed
co-incidence signal of a positron followed by a neutron capture within a given time window.
The time elapsed between the positron and the neutron capture event follows an exponential
decay curve allowing the subtraction of random coincidence events which display a flat timing
distribution. This process is described in detail in section 5.3.
3.3. Detector Commissioning and Testing
A proof-of-concept experiment was built with removable gadolinium inserts to observe the
difference between gadolinium and hydrogen neutron captures (hydrogen has a smaller capture
5
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Figure 2: Results of the small scale and full scale source tests. Left: A histogram of integrated charge deposit
for neutron capture events in a small prototype detector. The integrated area of the curves is proportional to the
neutron capture rate. Right: The neutron-gamma discrimination abilities for the full scale detector using 252Cf
and 60Co sources. The x-axis shows integrated charge for individual MPPC hits over a given charge threshold.
The y-axis shows total integrated charge.
cross section and emits a single 2.2 MeV γ-ray on neutron capture). 252Cf was used as a neutron
source. The source was enclosed in lead shielding to attenuate out > 99% of its γ-ray emissions.
Figure 2 shows the clear difference in neutron capture rates with and without gadolinium. A
20-layer prototype was subsequently constructed and tested using the same 252Cf source with
shielding. The 20-layer prototype was also exposed to a 60Co γ-ray source for comparison.
Figure 2 shows the clear neutron-γ-ray discrimination of the detector.
For commissioning and testing of the full 49-layer prototype, several data runs were taken se-
lecting cosmic ray muons for data performance checks as well as a cross check for the energy scale
calibrations. Muons passing through the detector deposit energy in accordance with the Bethe-
Bloch formula. By comparing the observed charge deposit in the detector with the predicted
energy deposit, an absolute energy scale calibration can be made. Energy scale calibrations from
the radioactive 60Co source and cosmic ray muons were found to be consistent. Figure 3 shows an
event display of a cosmic ray track passing with a fit of its calculated path through the detector.
The correct energy response and cosmic ray tracking verify the correct function of the detector.
Additionally, this calibration is crucial to future extensions of the analysis to energy spectrum
measurements.
4. Field Tests at Wylfa Power Station
4.1. Wylfa Power Station
The Wylfa site is located on the Isle of Anglesey, North Wales in the U.K. and houses two
1.6 GWth Magnox reactors which began generating in 1971. Reactor 2 was shut-down perma-
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Figure 3: A cosmic ray track passing through the detector. Each plot shows a projection of the track on each
face of the detector with each block representing a scintillator bar.
nently in 2012. Reactor 1 continued operation under the novel inter reactor transfer (IRX)
programme whereby partially irradiated fuel is transferred from reactor 2. Reactor 1 has been
shut-down permanently at the end of 2015.
Magnox reactors are named for the magnesium-oxide cladding on the fuel assemblies. They
use natural uranium fuel, carbon dioxide gas cooling and a graphite moderator. Due to the low
burn-up of the natural uranium fuel, Magnox reactors were designed to be re-fuelled on load.
In terms of the anti-neutrino field tests, this means that the effects of fuel burn-up should be
minimal as depleted fuel elements are replaced regularly.
4.2. Deployment at Wylfa
The University of Liverpool detector was deployed at Wylfa power station for testing starting
April 2014, shortly before the start of the final power generating cycle of the Wylfa Magnox
powers station. The container was transported by road from University of Liverpool to the
Wylfa site. The flat-bed truck used for delivery was an industry standard for transportation of
cargo containers. It came with its own HIAB (lifting crane), hence reducing the requirements
and burden on the power station for installation. Figure 4 shows the container being loaded
on to the transport vehicle at the University of Liverpool. The detector was placed outside the
reactor building and next to the turbine halls at a distance of roughly 60 m from the centre of
the reactor core. The detector is outside of internal security barriers surrounding the reactor
building, minimising the issues with site access and security clearance at the cost of being further
from the reactor core. Figure 4 shows the container and project team on-site after successful
deployment.
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Figure 4: Photographs of the Liverpool detector deployment process. Left: Loading of the shipping container
onto the flat-bed truck at the University of Liverpool. Right: The University of Liverpool team and Wylfa power
station staff after the deployment of the container on the reactor site.
4.3. On-site Test Data and Commissioning
On-site checks and commissioning runs were performed after deployment of the detector on-
site. Through the analysis of cosmic ray events it was confirmed that no damage had occurred
during transit. Minor calibrations were performed to adjust for the change in local environment.
The detector then began collecting data before the reactor returned to service. Further data
was taken with a 252Cf neutron source at the Wylfa site for the development of a neutron
identification algorithm in the presence of realistic backgrounds. This data was combined with
data from cosmic rays for comparison. Particle identification (PID) comparison plots with the
neutron source are shown in Figure 5. The background data contains small clusters of energy
deposited by high energy γ-rays, and cosmic muons that clip the detectors edge, where the
spatial size in the detector (x-axis) is roughly equal to the number of scintillator bars hit (y-
axis). Cosmic rays that fully penetrate the detector are seen at a cluster length of 49 cm which
is the height of the active region of the detector. From the 252Cf source data it can be seen that
for neutrons there is no correlation between the size of a cluster and the number of hits in the
cluster. A series of cuts were developed from these PID plots to select neutron capture candidate
events. Candidate neutron capture events are selected at the rate of roughly 1 Hz in reactor off
conditions.
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Figure 5: Neutron particle identification plots. Left: Data taken at Wylfa before reactor restart combined with
cosmic ray data Right: Data taken with a 252Cf neutron source. Top: Cluster length in z plotted against the
number of hits above threshold. Bottom: Total charge in detector plotted against the charge of the highest charge
hit.
5. Data Analysis
5.1. Event Reconstruction
The raw data from the detector is processed in the oﬄine data analysis using the ROOT
analysis framework [20]. In order to facilitate high-level candidate event selection (see section 5.2
and 5.3), the low-level data has to be translated into high-level physics properties. In order to
calibrate data for the MPPCs response, dedicated calibration data from a clock-based, non-
physics, trigger is used to establish the baseline “pedestal” or zero pixel signal shape and rate.
Random dark noise within these triggers create a one-pixel peak which is compared to the
pedestal to calculate the MPPC gain. These values are then used to convert signals from ADC
units to pixels fired equivalent units.
After calibration, nearest neighbour-based reconstruction algorithms are used to identify
high-level features of events that can be mapped to physics-related processes. The main features
of interest are hit clusters (for positrons and neutrons) and tracks (for cosmic rays). These
high-level objects are then used for the following cut-based selection procedure. The topology of
events of interest can be seen in figure 6.
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Figure 6: Example event displays of events of interest in the detector. Filled volumes represent hit bars passing
the selection criteria for the reconstruction. Green indicates hit bars associated with a cosmic-like track, red
indicates a positron-like cluster and blue indicates a neutron-like cluster. Left: Cosmic ray event leaving a clear
and visible track passing through the entirety of the detector. Right: Anti-neutrino candidate event, showing the
double coincidence with a short track associated with the positron (red) and the delayed spatially diffuse splash
of the neutron (blue).
5.2. Positron Selection and Fast Neutron Rejection
The neutron selection is used to select the delayed signal in an inverse β-decay event as
described in section 3.2. An equivalent positron selection has been developed to identify the
prompt signal component. The positron selection has been partially developed utilising electrons
from high energy γ-ray interactions. Electrons (and positrons) leave a small clustered energy
deposit in the detector in the form of a short particle track. The energy range of the positron
track is dictated by the energy of the interacting anti-neutrino which informs energy range in
which to search for the prompt signal.
Data from the 252Cf source was also used to develop methods for the rejection of fast neutron
backgrounds which produce a correlated time signal similar to that of an anti-neutrino event.
The time window for the delayed coincidence search is constrained by the electronics at 30µs in
the detector.
Additional position and calibration-derived quantities are used to remove spurious signals. A
fiducial volume criterion is implemented to reject events that originated outside of the detector.
Furthermore, track fitting algorithms are used to detect events with long tracks associated with
cosmic rays which can be used for data quality and calibration measurements.
5.3. Uncorrelated Background Subtraction
Uncorrelated background events are when independent positron-like and neutron-like events
randomly occur within the 30µs time window of the delayed coincidence search. As the prompt
10
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Figure 7: Left: The time between delayed and prompt signals for candidate anti-neutrino events during reactor-
on data taking after subtraction of uncorrelated backgrounds. Data is fit with an exponential function plus a
constant (p2). Detector efficiency effects alter the timing distribution in the first two and the final bins which
have been excluded from the fit. Right: Daily observed candidate count for the reactor-off period (3 July to 12
July) with a mean of 171.6 ± 11.2 and a corresponding fit of 172.1 ± 4.6 candidate events per day. This rate is
used to establish the reactor-off base rate of the detector.
and delayed signals are created independently they show an essentially flat time delay distribu-
tion, rather than the exponential decay distribution observed in correlated events. By inverting
particle identification event selection criteria, a background sample rich in uncorrelated events is
created by rejecting events with particles involved in true coincidence events, leaving a sample of
random coincidences. This background-enriched sample is used to establish the rate of random
coincidence signals within the search window. By scaling the random coincidence rate to the
signal rate a probability that any given event is a random coincidence event is calculated. The
random coincidence probability is continuously monitored in the data and the contribution to
the anti-neutrino signal candidate events sample is subtracted after the full selection. Figure 7
shows the time delay distribution for anti-neutrino candidate events after subtraction of uncor-
related backgrounds. The data is fit with an exponential decay plus a constant. The constant
is consistent with zero, indicating that the majority of the uncorrelated background has been
subtracted.
6. Results
6.1. Reactor Turn-On Observation
Reactor 1 at the Wylfa Magnox plant was restarted mid-month In July 2014. This gradual
ramp-up began with operation at ca. 0.9 GWth, followed by an increase to ca. 1.6 GWth towards
the end of the month. The reactor-off period was used to establish a baseline background rate,
resulting in a mean of 171.6 ± 11.2. The reactor-off data were fitted with a constant, resulting
11
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Figure 8: Daily count rates of detected anti-neutrino candidates averaged over 7-day intervals for the Wylfa power
plant switch-on and the reactor thermal power reported by the plant operator. Error bars indicate the statistical
uncertainty only.
in a fit value of 172.1± 4.6, showing good agreement with both the mean, and a constant stable
background rate. The reactor-off data and the corresponding fit are shown in figure 7.
Shortly after the off-period, a neutron source was brought for tests as described in section 4.3
on 16 July resulting in a thermal shift and miscalibration for regular operation causing a loss
in detector efficiency until 28 July. After recalibration and recovery, the detector continued to
take data with the reactor at full power. During the nominally calibrated full power period (29
July to 21 August), an increased candidate event count of 203.7 ± 19.6 candidates per day was
observed. Shown in figure 8 are the daily candidate counts averaged in 7-day intervals versus the
reactor thermal power reported by the site operators, showing the clear increase in candidates
with the operating reactor, even during the half-power period and the period of lowered detector
efficiency. Subsequent to the observation of the reactor turn on, the detector was reconfigured
to investigate alternative running conditions.
6.2. Statistical Significance
In order to qualify the statistical significance of the observed excess in candidates, the reactor-
off observation is used to form the null hypothesis. Since the Poisson error (
√
171.6 = 13.1)
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Figure 9: Left: Null hypothesis p-values for the cumulative 3-hourly candidate count during the reactor full power
period, starting at 29 July. The dashed lines indicate 1, 2 and 3 σ significance thresholds for candidates in excess
of the null hypothesis. Right: Pseudo-experiment distribution for the expected average observation of 228.7 events
at 45 m distance with 100,000,000 pseudo-experiments, with an expected excess of over 4σ significance after a day
of operation.
for the observed reactor off rate shows good agreement with the observed standard deviation
(±10.3), the expected candidate count uncertainty is assumed to be purely statistical. The
cumulative expected candidate count is then calculated in 3 hour intervals and compared to the
observed cumulative candidate count to calculate the corresponding p-values in favour of the
null hypothesis (reactor-off). The clear downward trend in p-values shown in figure 9 indicates
an accumulating excess of event candidates. The excess reaches 1σ significance after 15 h, 2σ
significance after 24 h and 3σ significance after 27 h. As the anti-neutrino flux falls with the
inverse square of the distance from the core, moving the detector to 45 m distance is expected to
raise the average candidate rate to ca. 228.7 per day. In a toy experiment, the expected reactor-
on value tested against the null hypothesis, as shown in figure 9 using pseudo-experiments. This
test results in a p-value of 6.75×10−6 within 24 h (4.4σ), not accounting for the statistical spread
of the observed candidate count. Hence, at 45 m distance, a 3σ excess is expected to be seen
within a single day.
7. Summary and Outlook
An anti-neutrino detector for safeguards purposes has been constructed and commissioned
at the University of Liverpool based on the technology used for the ECal of the T2K experi-
ment. The detector design uses only safe and robust materials in order to be as safeguards- and
operations-compliant as possible. Commissioning data shows the detector to be highly effective
at neutron-γ-ray discrimination due to the use of a gadolinium neutron absorber. Combined
with the ability to detect positrons, the anti-neutrino detector is well suited to the observation of
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inverse β-decay interactions. The detector has been deployed in an ISO container at the Wylfa
power station reactor site in the UK for field testing. Initial results from analysis of the data
and selection of candidate anti-neutrino events have shown the ability to observe statistically
significant excess (3σ) of anti-neutrino-like candidate events during active reactor periods after
less than 2 days of operation at 60 m distance. An series of upgrades to the detector based on
the experience at Wylfa nuclear power station are currently being implemented in conjunction
with John Caunt Scientific Ltd, supported by a grant from Innovate-UK.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported of the STFC Innovations Partnership Scheme (IPS), the Royal
Society of Edinburgh, the Royal Society. We are grateful for the support and contributions of
the Particle Physics group and the mechanical workshop from the Physics Department at the
University of Liverpool. We would like to thank the members T2K-UK for their advice and the
loan of relevant components. The authors are also grateful for the support and effort from the
staff at Wylfa Power Station. The necessary introductions for site access were facilitated through
the Department of Energy and Climate Control (DECC) and the Office for Nuclear Regulation
in response to approach from the UK Support Programme to the IAEA (UKSP). The UKSP is
funded by DECC to provide technical support to the IAEA Department of Safeguards.
References
[1] Abe, K. et al. The T2K experiment. Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research
A 659, 106–135 (2011).
[2] Cowan, C. L., Reines, F., Harrison, F. B., Kruse, H. W. & McGuire, A. D. Detection of the
free neutrino: A Confirmation. Science 124, 103–104 (1956).
[3] Mikaelian, L. Neutrino laboratory in the atomic plant, vol. 2 of Neutrino ’77: Proceedings
of the International Conference on Neutrino Physics and Neutrino Astrophysics (Nauka,
1978).
[4] Boehm, F. et al. The Palo Verde reactor neutrino oscillation experiment. Nuclear Physics
B - Proceedings Supplements 77, 166 – 170 (1999).
[5] Apollonio, M. et al. Search for neutrino oscillations on a long baseline at the CHOOZ nuclear
power station. Eur. Phys. J. C27, 331–374 (2003).
14
[6] Eguchi, K. et al. First results from KamLAND: Evidence for reactor antineutrino disap-
pearance. Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 021802 (2003).
[7] Bowden, N. S. Reactor monitoring and safeguards using antineutrino detectors. Journal of
Physics Conference Series 136, 022008 (2008).
[8] Bowden, N. S. Observation of the isotopic evolution of pressurized water reactor fuel using
an antineutrino detector. Journal of Applied Physics 105, 064902 (2009).
[9] Ko, Y.J. et al. Sterile Neutrino Search at the NEOS Experiment. Phys. Rev. Lett. 118,
121802 (2017).
[10] An, F.P. et al. Evolution of the Reactor Antineutrino Flux and Spectrum at Daya Bay.
Phys. Rev. Lett. 118, 251801 (2017).
[11] Alekseev, I. et al. Search for sterile neutrinos at the DANSS experiment. arXiv:1804.04046
https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.04046 (2018).
[12] Bak, G. et al. Fuel-composition dependent reactor antineutrino yield and spectrum at
RENO. arXiv:1806.00574 https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.00574 (2018).
[13] Ashenfelter, J. et al. First search for short-baseline neutrino oscillations at HFIR with
PROSPECT. arXiv:1806.02784 https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.02784 (2018).
[14] Boireau, G. et al. Online monitoring of the Osiris reactor with the Nucifer neutrino detector.
Phys. Rev. D 93, 112006 (2016).
[15] dos Anjos, J. et al. Final Report: Focused Workshop on Antineutrino Detection for Safe-
guards Application (2008). Report of IAEA Workshop.
[16] Mueller, T. A. et al. Improved predictions of reactor antineutrino spectra. Phys. Rev. C
83, 054615 (2011).
[17] Allan, D. et al. The Electromagnetic Calorimeter for the T2K Near Detector ND280. JINST
8, P10019 (2013).
[18] Kandlakunta, P. & Cao, L. Gamma-ray rejection, or detection, with gadolinium as a con-
verter. Radiation Protection Dosimetry 151, 586–590 (2012).
[19] MIDAS - Maximum Integrated Data Acquisition System http://midas.psi.ch/.
15
[20] Brun, R. & Rademakers, F. ROOT - an object oriented data analysis framework. Proceedings
AIHENP’96 Workshop (1996).
16
